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The 1990s financial crises triggered many changes to the design of the international 
financial system, the so-called international financial architecture.  While much 
affected, developing countries have had very little influence on the changes, which the 
formulation of the new Basle capital accord (B-II) illustrates.  The article shows that 
B-II has largely been formulated to serve the interests of powerful market players, 
with developing economies being left out.  For developing countries, B-II can make 
domestic financing more costly and raise the costs of and reduce the access to external 
financing.  Importantly, B-II can exacerbate fluctuations in the supply of external 
financing, an unfortunate outcome, given that developing countries already suffer 
from volatility.  
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The financial crises of the 1990s led to a debate on the reform of international 
financial architecture. In response to the crises, international institutions dealing with 
financial governance such as the Basle Committee on Banking Supervision (BC), the 
OECD, the IMF, World Bank, and the newly created Financial Stability Forum (FSF) 
promulgated a range of international standards to shape and facilitate market 
behaviour. These new standards were held up as models for developing and other 
countries to follow and have been implemented and assessed through various 
mechanisms (Financial Sector Assessment Programmes (FSAP), Report on Standards 
and Codes (ROSC), etc.).   This (new) set of standards and institutions has been called 
the international financial architecture. 
The new Basle capital accord (B-II), now in its (difficult) implementation phase, 
is part of this new international financial architecture. As with the other standards, the 
policy process leading to B-II largely excluded inputs from developing countries. 
Nevertheless, and although the accord is formally only applicable to internationally 
active banks of G10 countries, it is likely to become the global norm for banks, 
thereby affecting the costs of domestic and international financial intermediation. B-II 
is especially significant for the cost of international capital for developing countries 
and could reduce their access to external financing. By employing B-II as a case of 
the skewed policy process underlying international financial architecture reform, this 
article seeks to achieve two different, yet interrelated analytical objectives.  
In the first place, this article examines the process through which B-II was 
formulated, explaining how the particular standards were proposed and adopted. The 
core argument is that B-II capital requirements were formulated in a relatively 
  3exclusionary and closed policy community consisting of regulators and supervisors 
from the G10 leading industrial nations and their private sector interlocutors. In these 
networks, private market interests find respondents in finance ministers and central 
bankers and have thus been able to shape policy at the global level. The final rules and 
standards sanctified by B-II tend to advance the interests of powerful market players 
with little regard for developing and emerging market economies, despite the fact that 
the impact of B-II is far wider than the banking institutions and markets of G10 
committee members.
1
Secondly, the article discusses the likely impact of B-II on the financial system of 
developing countries and develops several measures of its impact on capital flows to 
developing countries. The central claim advanced here is that the new standards are 
likely to exacerbate fluctuations in the costs and availability of external financing for 
many developing countries. This outcome is unfortunate in view of the expectation of 
many that the new international financial architecture in general and B-II in particular, 
by enhancing the safety and soundness of the system as a whole, will also provide 
significant benefits for the most vulnerable members of the international community. 
The Basel accord also needs to be considered in relation to other elements of the 
new international financial architecture. Developing countries have had very little 
influence on the formulation of the new standards, potentially undermining their 
legitimacy and effectiveness. Representation of many developing countries in the IMF 
                                                 
1 The Committee itself accepts that its standards should be adopted by a wide range of supervisory 
authorities: “This document is being circulated to supervisory authorities worldwide with a view to 
encouraging them to consider adopting this revised framework at such time as they believe is consistent 
with their supervisory priorities (Basle Committee 2006a, 15).” The Committee’s own website 
homepage accepts that “Over recent years, it has developed increasingly into a standard-setting body 
on all aspects of banking supervision, including the B-II regulatory capital framework (web address 
http://www.bis.org/bcbs/index.htm).” According to a Financial Stability Institute (FSI) survey, some 88 
non-Basle Committee supervisors will adopt the framework, and by 2009 some 5,000 banks in 73 
countries, representing 75% of non-Basle Committee banking assets, will be subject to the standards, 
the principal motivation being that many of these banks are foreign controlled by G10 financial 
institutions (FSI 2004, 5) and to which the principles of consolidated supervision apply. 
  4and World Bank is not in accordance with their share of global economic activity. 
While the formation of the G-20 and the Financial Stability Forum might have 
rendered some international decision-making processes more inclusive, the 
membership and structural hierarchy of these and other forums leave little doubt that 
the global financial system continues to be run by the leading industrial nations. Even 
those emerging markets included often assert different interests from and lack 
collective bargaining power vis-à-vis the dominant members.  
At the same time, the costs of implementing the new standards are higher for 
developing countries than for the developed countries.  Developing economies are 
institutionally further from the “norms” being promulgated and international 
institutions and (major) developed members have considerable leverage over 
developing countries in terms of enforcement.  The new international financial 
architecture also manifests some serious myopia in relation to emerging markets, e.g. 
the lack of a predictable sovereign debt workout system exacerbates the risks of 
lending to developing countries, thus increasing the cost and volatility. Yet, progress 
on such a system has been stymied by, among others, the unwillingness of creditor 
countries and their private sectors to consider changes.  In other words, the same 
combination of interests as initiated and developed B-II has blocked reforms of 
interest to developing countries.  As such, this article serves as one example of the 
shortcomings of current reform efforts and the adverse impacts on developing 
countries.  To ensure changes to the system benefiting all, reform of the governance 
of the international financial system itself is needed. 
The first section of this article places B-II in the context of broader changes in 
global financial governance in the last 15 years, in particular the post-East Asia crisis 
reform process.  The second section focuses on the BC and the new capital accord 
  5specifically, supporting the claim that the policy process gives better voice to G10 
private financial institutions than to the constituency of developing countries, despite 
the fact that the Committee’s impact is clearly broader than its membership suggests.  
The third section examines the impact of such a process on the global financial system 
and on the costs of financial intermediation, with particular attention to the likely 
effects that the new agreement will have on the cost and/or volume of capital flows 
for emerging market and developing countries.  Using data from major banks’ own 
internal ratings systems and the BC’s own Quantitative Impact Survey, this section 
supports the claim that B-II is likely to have negative consequences for especially the 
poorest countries, certainly where sovereign lending is concerned. 
 
1.  The new international financial architecture: a short overview  
 
This section argues that B-II fits in a context of financial architecture reform which 
essentially emphasises improved facilitation of market processes.  Measures to 
improve the functioning of markets have included the range of institution-building, 
macroeconomic and other standards promoted by IFIs and since adopted by national 
governments referred to in the introduction.  This approach has dominated debate and 
policy despite some of the well-known difficulties such a system bodes for the victims 
of “original sin” even when they adhere to sound standards of governance.
2  
During the 1980s, a range of developing country strategies shifted from state 
intervention, capital controls, and trade protection/import substitution to one 
dominated by economic openness, fiscal discipline, and a greater degree of market-led 
adjustment, in line with what came to be called, in an article by John Williamson, the 
                                                 
2 See the collection edited by Eichengreen and Hausmann (2005).  In their introduction, they put the 
point succinctly: “If much was promised, less was delivered (p. 3)….there is little evidence that the 
standard institutional reforms will redeem them from original sin (p. 6).” 
  6‘Washington Consensus’.
3  In a number of respects, Mexico and other countries went 
further than what Williamson specified as ‘consensus’ to embrace more radical 
aspects of the ‘neo-liberal’ platform of rapid opening of the capital account, rapid 
financial system liberalization, far-reaching privatization, and a reduction of welfare 
provision,
4 and often pegged exchange rates as well.  This approach was seen as a 
corrective to interventionist ‘infant industry’ approaches associated with Raul 
Prebisch and the UN Economic Commission on Latin America in the 1950s.  The 
sovereign debt crisis and extreme inflation of the 1970s questioned this development 
policy rationale, and the extraordinary growth of private capital markets from the 
1980s onwards demonstrated the need to think not only about official sector transfers 
in development policy, but also to create conditions conducive to private sector 
investment.  Private investors prefer developed countries at least partially because 
developing countries constitute greater investment risks, even though success 
promises greater returns.  If developing countries could reduce the risks posed by 
inflation, exchange rate volatility, indebtedness, reduce the arbitrariness of what were 
perceived to be politically driven state intervention strategies, and reduce structural 
rigidities impairing the adjustment process, then capital would be more likely to flow 
towards emerging market countries.  This would require a major adaptation of the 
legal, institutional, and substantive policy framework within developing countries.  
Market-led development would also lead to smoother adjustment processes, avoiding 
the pitfalls of debt-financed state-led strategies. 
                                                 
3 Williamson (1990) claimed, in a cautious assessment, that there was consensus around was a series of 
market-oriented reforms in development policy for Latin American countries, and which pointedly did 
not include capital account liberalisation. 
4 As Williamson (2002) himself points out, the term also came to represent a more radical ‘neo-liberal’ 
ideology of minimalist state involvement, greatly reduced welfare provision, monetarism, and radical 
privatisation. 
  7By 1994 Mexico (regarded as a star pupil along with Argentina and others who 
imperfectly embodied the consensus) baffled the world of the Washington Consensus 
and plunged into a combination of exchange rate crisis and financial crisis that led to a 
controversial record IMF loan package assembled under US leadership.
5  At the 
Halifax G7 summit of June 1995 and subsequently at Lyons and Denver (1996-7), 
there was a re-examination of global financial and monetary governance.
6  The ‘Peso 
Crisis’ passed, however, with little changed at the international level and complacency 
reasserted itself.
7 This was despite a range of more and usually less radical proposals 
for change coming from academics and official sources.  Proposals focused largely on 
improving market signals to smooth volatility through better financial market 
transparency, stronger macroeconomic policy standards and IMF monitoring, 
complemented by better supervision (including at the international level), robust 
exchange rate regimes, and the like.  A consensus formed that radical change was not 
necessary. 
The 1997/98 crisis among the again star pupil (if often misunderstood) Asian 
tigers
8 caught officials and the private sector again by surprise.  Explanations such as 
exchange rate rigidities, a lack of transparency on macroeconomic policy, and poor 
financial supervision were again found ex post facto.  New causes also emerged, 
among them the sin of ‘crony capitalism’ and a failure to develop transparent market-
                                                 
5 It was of course always an option for more radical neo-liberals to claim that the real problem was that 
Mexico did not go far enough, and thus that the ‘consensus’ was in itself insufficiently radical. 
6 See the Halifax Summit document on reform of financial governance at 
http://www.g7.utoronto.ca/summit/1995halifax/financial/index.html; re Lyons summit at 
http://www.g7.utoronto.ca/summit/1996lyon/finance.html; the final report of the G7 finance ministers 
concerning financial architecture was presented at the Denver summit of 1997 – see 
http://www.g7.utoronto.ca/summit/1997denver/finanrpt.htm.  
7 Among the more radical proposals was that of an international bankruptcy court to facilitate sovereign 
debt workouts under more predictable conditions and an international banking standard (see Goldstein 
(1997). 
8 Although arguably the most successful examples of economic development, Japan and east/SE Asia, 
and now China, based their strategies on state-led investment strategies, import substitution combined 
with trade protection (progressing in time to export promotion), financial repression, and strict local 
content rules relating to foreign direct investment.  Such strategies were not insensitive to market forces 
and the need for competitiveness, but they were anything but market-led. 
  8based relationships in the corporate world.  Though contagion followed in Russia, 
Argentina, Turkey, and Brazil, and indeed the LTCM incident nearly brought collapse 
to Wall Street itself, the reform debate remained limited in scope and the process 
incremental in nature.  The one radical proposal from the official sector, the Sovereign 
Debt Workout Mechanism (SDRM) proposed by the IMF and which contained 
elements of a global bankruptcy procedure (Krueger 2002), was defeated by a 
combination of developing and developed member states alike at the IMF meetings of 
March 2003, in large part because of strong private sector opposition.  
In the late 1980s and 1990s, many developing countries implemented 
‘Washington Consensus’ reform policies, often going beyond it.  The emergence of 
post-Soviet ‘transition economies’ contributed to the sense of a triumph of market-
based approaches to economic development.  After the late 1990s financial crises, 
however, analysis revealed that insufficient attention had been paid to the legal, 
institutional, and regulatory aspects of market-based reform at the national and 
international levels.  While there was no essential re-examination of the approach 
itself, a serious reckoning with the way in which it had been implemented in various 
settings occurred. 
The 1998 Birmingham G7 summit document
9 at the height of the Asian Crisis 
provides perhaps the clearest statement of what it termed an ‘emerging consensus’.  
First, it stressed ‘transparency,’ meant to include the provision of ‘accurate and 
timely’ macroeconomic and supervisory data (e.g., reserve positions, levels of 
national public and private indebtedness).  Countries would adhere to IMF Special 
Data Dissemination Standard (SDDS) codes, and the IMF would accelerate the 
publication of data on central bank reserve positions.  Transparency in national and 
                                                 
9 See the report at http://www.g8.utoronto.ca/summit/1998B-Irmingham/g7heads.htm.  
  9IFI policymaking would also enhance investor confidence, reducing uncertainty and 
improving investment pricing in the market.  Secondly, it argued that weak national 
financial systems required sound macroeconomic, regulatory and supervisory policies 
first and that capital account opening would only then be advisable.  It also mentioned 
that foreign financial firms should have full access to emerging markets in order to 
transfer skills and expertise, and enhance financial system functioning.  Thirdly, 
national financial systems needed strengthening in relation to corporate governance 
practices and norms (something to which a number of developed countries might 
have, in retrospect, paid more attention) and supervision, achieved through the Basle 
‘Core Principles’ for Effective Banking Supervision
10 and multilateral surveillance of 
supervisory practice.
11  Fourthly, the private sector must take greater responsibility: 
burden-sharing in debt workout/lending on in crises so public resources do not 
underpin private gain; no more implicit or explicit government or IFI guarantees of 
crisis ‘bailout’ which risks moral hazard.  National bankruptcy laws needed 
clarification, enhancing understanding of risks and the consequences of mistakes.  
Fifthly, the IMF was designated to lead greater inter-IFI co-operation, co-ordinating 
multilateral and bilateral aspects of stabilization efforts.  Finally, global forums for 
better dialogue between emerging market and developed creditor countries should be 
developed; the establishment of the Financial Stability Forum (FSF) with a secretariat 
in Basle (1999) and the G10-G20 consultation process were the principal results of 
this aspect of the reforms.
12  
                                                 
10 First issued in September 1997; latest version October 2006, Basle Committee (2006b). 
11 Via the Committee on the Global Financial System and Committee on Payment and Settlement 
Systems (both G10), the Core Principles Liaison Group, and International Conference of Banking 
Supervisors (liaison with non-G10 supervisors). 
12 For a broader account of standards and what was developed from the Birmingham principles, see the 
Financial Stability Forum web site “Compendium of Standards/12 Key Standards for Sound Financial 
Systems.” http://www.fsforum.org/compendium/key_standards_for_sound_financial_system.html.  
  10These reform measures largely assumed that problems and eventual solutions lay 
more in the reform of the weak institutions and practices of the emerging market 
economies than with the international financial architecture itself.  The only 
architectural reform as such was the establishment of the FSF and two committees to 
monitor multilateral supervisory practice, and the designation the IMF as the lead 
institution for co-ordinated debt workout.  At the same time, policymaking in 
developing countries was further constrained through transparency/new standards and 
enhanced monitoring, to conform better to the expectations and preferences of 
investors.  As it maintained the largely market-oriented approach of the Washington 
consensus, it ignored considerable empirical evidence that many successful 
development processes, including of European countries, did not occur under a 
particularly open market orientation. 
This outcome reflected who the key players were, who controlled the agenda, and 
who responded to and shaped proposals over time.  Given the diversity of national 
financial systems and legal/policy making institutions in the developing world as 
obstacles to stability, a ‘one-size-fits-all’ solution is clearly a problem (Rodrik, 1999). 
Therefore one might have expected considerable consultation between those 
proposing the reforms and those who must accept and implement them.  Although 
some argue that emerging market participation in global financial governance has 
increased significantly (Germain 2001), the case remains weak.  The G7/G10 
governments, and the private sectors in these countries, remain in a commanding 
position relative to the IMF, the G20 process, the FSF, and other institutions such as 
the OECD or the broader ‘Basle Process’ based at the BIS.  With the exception of the 
IMF, the OECD, and to some extent the G20, there is no emerging market 
membership in any of these bodies.   The establishment of the G20, including some 
  11emerging market economies, as a consultative body to the G10/G7 process, including 
deliberations in the broader ‘Basle Process’, constitutes progress but does not 
represent full membership of the key bodies.  While Hong Kong and Singapore are 
members of the FSF, they hardly qualify as developing countries under current 
circumstances, and represent a tiny population. In the IMF, a considerable number of 
the executive directors representing transition or developing countries are in fact from 
developed countries (e.g., Belgium, The Netherlands, Spain, Italy, Canada, Iceland 
and Australia together represent some 71 countries, or 64 in addition to themselves).
13  
Despite the recent IMF quota adjustment favouring four developing countries (China, 
South Korea, Mexico and Turkey), the cumulative vote of developing countries 
remains much below their share of global economic activity.  In the end, the G7 
finance ministers developed the agenda and led the debate.  Importantly, G7/G10 
central banks and treasury ministries have close and long-standing relationships to 
their respective private financial sectors and are responsive to their preferences.
14  As 
a consequence, it is far more likely that developed country private sector preferences 
were central to the proposals than the preferences of either developing country states 
or the corresponding financial institutions and corporations thereof. 
 
2.  The Political Economy of Basel II 
 
This section focuses on the BC and the B-II accord specifically.  It outlines the 
content as well as the background to the new capital adequacy agreement and 
demonstrates that, despite its broad global impact, it reflects the preferences of a 
                                                 
13 See IMF web site, http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/memdir/eds.htm) 
14 For a comparative analysis of developed country state-financial sector relations under conditions of 
global integration, see Coleman (1996); and for an analysis of finance-government relationships 
relative to the negotiation of the EU single financial market, see Story and Walter (1998); for a classic 
characterization of state-financial sector relations in the UK, see Moran (1986). 
  12narrow constituency of interests.  The new accord confers competitive advantage on 
the very internationally active banks which originally proposed it.  
 
From Basle I to B-II 
 
The motivations for the new Accord (B-II), ostensibly arose from a number of 
technical weaknesses in Basel I (B-I), from changes in financial services provision 
globally, and from the corresponding changes in the pattern of old and emergence of 
new risks.  The main weakness of B-1 was that the capital reserves assigned to loans 
did not distinguish between the real default risks of different sorts of debtors (Basle 
Committee 1999, 8-9).  One obvious distortion was the zero weighting given to loans 
to all OECD governments, treating capital adequacy requirements for e.g., Korea and 
Mexico the same as developed countries.  It also ignored the considerable difference 
between loans to major, stable and recognized companies versus risky ventures with 
new technologies or the uncertainty of speculative minerals exploration.  Nor was 
much attention paid to the correlations among the various risks, which ignored the 
potential gains from diversification.  Finally, the earlier accord did not properly 
account for operational risk in lending and securities market activities of banks.  
These weaknesses skewed risk management incentives, encouraged securitisation and 
potentially led to poor asset composition, with in turn negative effects on resource 
allocation and systemic risks (Basle Committee 1999, 9).  Finally, rapid changes in 
contemporary financial services industries left supervisors facing a constant array of 
new market innovations and risks which could not be handled by traditional 
supervisory practices.  The conclusion was that a major revision was necessary. 
The starting points were to better measure risk exposures, to emphasize more risk 
management and to increase the role of market discipline.  In B-II this led to the so-
  13called ‘three pillars’ consisting of 1. minimum capital requirements; 2. supervisory 
review of capital adequacy; and 3. public disclosure (Basle Committee 2003).  Under 
the three pillar system bank owners and risk managers, supervisors, and market forces 
combine forces to oversee banks, and bank supervisors will no longer be exclusively 
responsible for the supervisory process and specifying levels of capital adequacy. 
Pillar one maintains the basic provisions of B-I but institutes important changes in 
the way aspects of risks are to be calculated and expands the range of risks to include 
operational risks.  Three different options for measuring required capital are available 
to banks under the proposals.  The Standardised approach for less sophisticated 
institutions is based on B-I but enhances risk sensitivity, with differential ‘risk 
weightings’ for sovereign and corporate exposures, to be calculated according to 
external credit assessments such as the OECD or commercial ratings agencies 
(Standard and Poor, Moody’s etc).  Option two, the ‘Foundation’ version of the 
‘Internal Ratings Based’ (IRB) approach to risk management, makes limited use of 
internal Value at Risk (VaR) and other models.  And option three, the ‘Advanced’ 
IRB approach, is meant for the largest and most sophisticated financial institutions.  In 
the Foundation version, only the probability of default is calculated by the bank, and 
all other capital ratios are specified by the supervisor.  In the Advanced version, all 
aspects of credit risk are estimated by the bank itself.  The Committee characterizes 
the advanced approach as “…a point on the continuum between purely regulatory 
measures of credit risk and an approach that builds more fully on internal credit risk 
model.”, with further movement along the continuum as “foreseeable” (Basle 
Committee 2006a, 17).  Collateral and loan guarantees are to be taken into account in 
all approaches. 
  14Essentially option three is a ‘self-supervision’ approach, but qualified by the 
compliance provisions of Pillar Two.  Banks’ risk management must qualify for the 
internal ratings approach.  Supervisors must also approve and regularly assess (stress 
testing) the internal application of risk management models.  Pillar three consists of 
‘Market Discipline’ in the form of public disclosure of, among others, bank risk 
profiles and capitalization as a compliment to the first two pillars.  This approach is 
based on claims by the industry itself that market discipline is the best guarantor of 
sound risk management, and that supervisory oversight is essentially redundant in a 
soundly functioning system of market discipline.
15  Implementation is now expected 
toward the end of 2007.  The new Accord has been subject to criticism on a number of 
grounds, best revealed through an analysis of the political economy of B-II policy-
making from conception to its current implementation phase.   
 
The Basel II Policy Process 
 
The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (initially ‘Basle Committee on 
Banking Regulations and Supervisory Practices’) was founded in 1974.  The Basel 
Committee (BC) was an initiative of the G10 central bank governors, who were 
spurred into action following the twin collapse of the Franklin National Bank and the 
Bankhaus Herstatt in eurocurrency trading, both of which nearly toppled the global 
financial system at the time.
16  The BC reports to the G10 central bank governors and 
membership (currently in fact 13 countries
17) consists of one representative of each 
country (the national central bank, and if this is not the banking supervisor, then in 
                                                 
15 And therefore the claim is surely suspect as deriving from narrow self-interest, also given the 
negative externalities associated with financial crises.  Recent corporate scandals also cast some doubt 
on the sufficiency of public disclosure for proper management. 
16 For more on the history of the BC, see Wood (2005). 
17 Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Luxemburg, Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland, the UK, and the US. 
  15addition a representative of the national supervisory agency, this does not add an extra 
‘vote’ and the committee does not vote anyway, operating on a consensus basis).   
The initial policy question under consideration was one of supervisory 
responsibility for internationally active banking institutions: who precisely was 
responsible for supervising bank branches and subsidiaries across borders – home or 
host country? The first result was the Basle Concordat of 1975 guiding cross-border 
supervisory cooperation, which has since undergone numerous refinements and 
amendments.
18
The BC quickly gained a reputation for ‘Olympian’ detachment as a guardian of 
the public, essentially state, interest.
19  The BC operated under conditions of strict 
secrecy and relative insulation from public and private institutions of government and 
market.  The institutional culture of its earlier years contributed to this impression: 
global financial integration was in its early stages and the strong ‘public domain’ of 
the Bretton Woods post-war era in financial systems governance underpinned the 
Committee’s role and decision-making processes.  The negotiation of B-I to 1988 was 
the crowning achievement of the BC, and occurred with little formal consultation with 
‘outside’ interests. 
There is no doubt that up until the negotiation of the Market Risk Accord 
amending the 1988 B-I agreement (Basle Committee 1996), the Committee did 
operate in a considerably more detached manner than is the case today.  However, 
Olympian detachment and insulation from the traditional politics of government 
lobbies obscured a more prosaic reality.  Financial policy-making has historically 
taken place in relatively closed and exclusionary policy communities with central 
banks and autonomous regulatory agencies at the core of the system.  These policy 
                                                 
18 See analysis in Underhill (1997), pp. 23-8. 
19 See the state-centric account of Basle by Kapstein (1994). 
  16communities have often been characterized by ‘business corporatism’ and the 
delegation of public authority to private agencies via self-regulation (Coleman 1996; 
Moran 1986), which continues to be a primary instrument in the regulatory process 
today.  This close relationship between regulatory/supervisory agencies and their 
constituencies in the financial services industry is in fact enhanced by the ‘Olympian’ 
distance of central banks and other autonomous agencies with regulatory and 
supervisory responsibilities from the rough and tumble of traditional policy-making in 
democratic governments, such as in trade negotiations.  The politics of financial 
governance, at both the national and the transnational level, takes place in relatively 
closed communities between financial sector private interests and autonomous public 
authorities who share skills and knowledge. This in turn enhances these interests’ 
power and effectiveness in controlling the policy agenda and outcome.
20  This is even 
more so the case in developing countries with strong traditions of financial repression 
and state control of the credit allocation process (Zhang, 2003, 38-41). 
While the BC might appear to deliberate in Olympian detachment, national central 
banks and financial supervisors never did.  Regulatory policy in national system was 
developed in close co-operation with a small community of private interests which 
shared more with central banks and supervisors than with other sectors of the 
economy and society.  The process of international financial integration meant 
supervisory and regulatory bargains reached at the national level had to be adapted.  
B-I was the first attempt to achieve this in relation to capital adequacy.  The outcome 
of the agreement meant some national banking sectors had to raise substantial 
amounts of new capital, sharply affecting national cost of capital (Oatley and Nabors 
1998).  Calls emerged for the BC to consider more closely the impact of its decisions 
                                                 
20 These points are developed and supported empirically in Underhill 1995, 1997. 
  17on the banking sectors.  The result was the emergence of more BC consultation with 
the private sector, including with the Institute for International Finance (IIF)
21 based 
in Washington.  This consultation process expanded further with the Committee’s 
1993 proposals to amend B-I to include securities markets risks as applied to banks 
(Basle Committee 1993). 
This at first informal and until then unprecedented consultation process with IIF 
began when the IIF issued a paper sharply criticizing the 1993 BC paper: the 
proposals “fail[ed] to create sufficient regulatory incentives for banks to operate more 
sophisticated risk measurement systems than those necessary to meet the regulatory 
minimum”,
22 meaning VaR models.  A well-circulated and authoritative paper by 
Dimson and Marsh (1994) of the London Business School, arguing that VaR models 
were more effective than the Committee’s proposed approach, added to the pressure 
to revamp the proposal.  Two consecutive new consultative documents embraced the 
approach advocated by the IIF (Basle Committee 1995a, 1995b).  The pressure had 
worked, but the Committee’s new and soon to become formal interlocutor was hardly 
representative of the range of interested parties which would be affected by the 
amended accord or its successor, B-II.  There was no emerging market representation 
and the process did not extend beyond the traditionally close relationships between 
banks and supervisors/regulators.  Situated at the transnational level, one may argue, 
the emerging policy community was even further removed from traditional lines of 
democratic accountability in the policy process. 
Following the successful translation of IIF preferences into Committee policy, the 
IIF-BC relationship became regular practice as the Committee began to consider B-II 
                                                 
21 The IIF was originally formed as a consultative group of major US and European banks during the 
debt crisis of the 1980s, and became a more broadly based organisation representing some 350 member 
banks worldwide.  See website for membership, http://www.iif.com/about/member_list.quagga.  
22Institute for International Finance, Report of the Working Group on Capital Adequacy (Washington: 
IIF, 1993), cited in Financial Regulation Report, December 1993, p. 3. 
  18in the face of ongoing criticisms of B-I treatment of credit risk, which had remained 
so far unchanged.  In fact, the private sector began playing an even stronger agenda-
setting role than in the past.  The review of B-I began with a study group of the Group 
of Thirty, a private think-tank-like body of members drawn from the public/official 
and private institutions in the financial sector alike, many of whom had held 
prestigious appointments in both.  The group formed a study group and issued a report 
on systemic risk in the changing global financial system (Group of Thirty 1997).
23  As 
Paul Volcker, chairman of the G30 stated in the ‘Foreword’ to the report (p.ii),  
“The report concludes that an ambitious effort to produce an international 
framework to serve as a guide to the management, reporting and supervision of 
major financial institutions and markets is justified and even imperative, 
beginning with the global commercial and investment banks.  A collaborative 
effort between financial institutions and their supervisors would be most likely to 
be effective and broadly acceptable over a wide range of institutions and 
countries.” 
 
The report observed that management controls should play a central role in the 
supervision of financial systems, and that ‘core’ financial institutions should take the 
initiative to develop a new system along with “international groupings of 
supervisors.”  In essence, financial globalization had rendered the supervisory process 
increasingly difficult and beyond the reach of national supervisors.  The conclusions 
of the report (p. 12) implied that, 
“supervisors will be readier to rely on the institutions that they supervise, and that 
the institutions themselves will accept the responsibility to improve the structure 
of, and the discipline imposed by, their internal control functions.” 
 
Here lie the origins of the market-based supervisory approach contained in the 
three pillars of B-II.  In 1998 the IIF issued its own report specifically urging the BC 
to update B-I on the basis of banks’ market-based internal control mechanisms (IIF 
1998).  Although the BC invited consultations on its three sets of proposals for B-II, 
                                                 
23 The report includes the names of study group participants (pp. ix-x), and members of the G30 itself 
(pp. 47-8). 
  19the IIF remained the principal interlocutor, and comments came overwhelmingly from 
financial institutions in Europe and North America, and to a lesser extent official from 
agencies and a few academics and chambers of commerce/industry producer 
associations.
24   
While it might an exaggeration to make a claim of capture of the BC in the 
mid/late-1990s, there is little doubt that it is far more likely the BC and its member 
institutions will take into the account the articulated preferences of private sector 
interlocutors in developed countries than the interests of developing country 
supervisors and their corresponding financial sectors.
25  The long-institutionalized 
relationship between regulators and the regulated in financial supervision, which 
approximates conditions of capture, had developed at the transnational level by the 
mid-1990s.  And B-II derived directly from the proposals of the private sector.     
Consultation nonetheless means that the BC has been opening up.  Besides the 
financial sector, a few other interest associations have commented on B-II and the 
proposals did change over time in response.  Limited as these comments were, they 
are nonetheless revealing.  The next section analyses the range of criticisms as 
revealed by the consultation process, outlining the winners and losers of the accord, 
and who turn out to be the most politically influential in the policy process.   
 
                                                 
24 See Committee web site section on comments on proposals at 
http://www.bis.org/bcbs/cacomments.htm (comments on second consultative document) and 
http://www.bis.org/bcbs/cp3comments.htm (comments on third consultative document). 
25 This claim is well supported in Geoffrey R.D. Underhill, “The Public Good versus Private Interests 
in the Global Monetary and Financial System,” International and Comparative Corporate Law 
Journal, vol. 2/3, 2000, pp 335-359; — , “States, Markets, and Governance for Emerging Market 
Economies: private interests, the public good, and the legitimacy of the development process,” 
International Affairs, vol. 79/4, July 2003, esp. pp. 771-774. 
  20B-II: Winners and Losers 
There are clear distributional conflicts and level playing field issues surrounding B-II, 
and comments have been extensive.  Concerns have been raised by constituents in all 
countries regarding small and unrated banks and regarding access to financial services 
for (SME) corporate clients, issues of paramount interest for developing countries.  It 
is noteworthy that there were very few submissions to the BC from developing 
country financial institutions, and comments from the official sector in developing 
countries were usually brief,
26 though developing countries observed that they would 
have to submit to the new standards.  The fate of these comments is dealt with below, 
but the consultation debate and ongoing criticisms of the final accord leave little doubt 
that the primary beneficiaries of the accord in competitive terms are precisely the 
major financial institutions which proposed it in the first place.   
A first cleavage concerns conflict between large, internationally active and small 
banks.  The American Community Bankers (ACB), representing small US banks and 
‘thrift’ institutions, put it most bluntly: “Many community banks will end up holding 
higher capital under the accord as compared with global and potentially more risky 
institutions (ACB 2003, 3).”  This point was echoed by the German 
Bankenfachverband (small consumer financing banks) and a range of other national 
and EU-level associations.
27   Their concern is that, given high development and 
compliance costs, smaller banks are in no position to employ the Foundation and 
certainly not the Advanced IRB approaches and that use of the Standardised approach 
would lead to either relative or absolute increases in capital charges (relative to B-I) 
for these banks, leading to competitive disadvantages.
28   
                                                 
26 Of 186 for the 3
rd Consultation exercise, only 31 came from developing countries including Taiwan 
and Korea and off-shore financial centres. 
27 These and subsequent citations to position papers are available on the BC websites listed in note 24. 
28 Many developing country supervisors were in no position to implement the IRB approaches anyway. 
  21The BC’s own study reinforces this point: the reductions in capital required by 
moving to the advanced IRB approach relative to B-I are much greater than by 
moving to the Standardised or Foundation IRB  approaches  (BC 2006c, 5-11, p. 10, 
Table 5).  Note that none of the G10 large internationally active (so called ‘Group 1’) 
banks is expected to use the Standardised approach anyway, whereas 33 of the 153 
smaller G10 banks (‘Group 2’) are planning to do so.  This is even starker for the non-
G10 countries where 49 of 54 banks in non-G10 ‘Group 2’ (smaller) banks are 
planning to do so (p. 7, Table 3).
29  For these non-G10 Group 2 banks, the 
Standardised approach would yield a 38.2% increase in capital charges relative to B-I, 
the Foundation IRB approach an increase of 11.4%, and the Advanced IRB approach 
a modest reduction of 1% (p. 10, Table 5).  The impact is clear: substantial 
competitive advantages to those large banks (mostly in developed countries) who 
could apply the (Advanced) IRB approach.   
As banks in the global system began to realise the likely impact, level playing 
field concerns among banks, including at the international level, emerged.  Lobbies 
were also concerned that non-bank financial services firms should not gain 
competitive advantages as a result of the accord.  The American small banking lobby 
bore fruit when it the US decided to apply the new accord only to the 10-20 largest 
internationally active US banks (a choice the agreement allows national supervisors to 
make).  In the meantime, although also facing opposition, the EU stuck to its position 
that the accord would apply to all banks.   
Fears were also expressed by those small banks and their SME clients stuck with 
the Standardised approach.  This approach relies only on external rating agencies, 
                                                 
29 “Non-G10” included Australia, Singapore, and 7 developing countries.  There were only 6 non-G10 
group 1 banks; the survey was anonymous, but it is highly likely that these were Australian and 
Singaporean as the criteria for group 1 banks are: the bank has at least €3 billion in capital, is 
diversified, and internationally active. 
  22with claims on highly rated clients (both financial and non-financial corporations) 
receiving lower capital charges (e.g., AAA to AA-, only 20%).  Most small credit 
institutions and SME clients, however, have no ratings (obtaining a rating is 
expensive).  Being unrated, they are subject to a 100% charge (Basle Committee 
2006a, 19-23), identical to Basel I, but an increase relative to other corporations, since 
all claims on the private sector were assigned a 100% charge under Basle I, even 
though risks have not increased.
30  B-II thus implies a clear relative capital cost 
disadvantage for both rated and unrated banks specialising in lending to SMEs, as 
well as to their clients.  In the end, strong lobbies in the EU spearheaded by smaller 
German banks were effective in obtaining more favourable treatments of SMEs and 
banks specializing in small scale lending.  
The situation for unrated banks or their clients in developing countries was worse: 
many sovereigns would attract a 100% (BB+ to B-) or a 150% (below B-) charge, and 
under the rules no bank or corporate client could have a charge lower than the 
weighting of the sovereign in which they were incorporated (Basle Committee 2006a, 
21-23).  For otherwise creditworthy entities within those countries, capital costs are 
thus set to rise relative to Basle I.  Developing country submissions to the BC 
identified this as a problem, arguing that some banks and corporations in developing 
countries were sounder than the sovereign and that the ratings of the bank and 
corporations should be considered separately from that of the sovereign and based on 
the real risks of lending to the bank or corporation itself.
 31  Yet their pleas were 
ignored.  
 
                                                 
30 See e.g. submissions on http://www.bis.org/bcbs/cp3comments.htm by Austrian Banking Industry, 
the German Bankenfachverband, the European Co-operative Banks, the World Council of Credit 
Unions, or the Kredittilsynet-Norges Bank (Norwegian central bank) submission.  
31 See e.g. submission of the central bank of Belize (http://www.bis.org/bcbs/cp3/belcenban.pdf) and of 
Burundi (http://www.bis.org/bcbs/cp3/burcenban.pdf). 
  23This yields further criticism of B-II that has particular implications for developing 
countries:
32 the differential risk weightings of B-II compared to B-I lead to a 
significant increase in capital requirements for loans to lower rated borrowers in low-
rated sovereigns, reducing the likely quantity of lending to these borrowers.
33  These 
lower rated borrowers tend to be developing country sovereigns or banks and firms in 
those economies.  
A related, but more technical aspect of particular relevance for developing 
countries concerns the risk reduction effects of (international) portfolio 
diversification.  As risks are not perfectly correlated, the individual capital adequacy 
requirements as determined by economic models applied to individual credits, do not 
add up to the overall need for capital in respect to the overall credit portfolio.  Banks 
not only benefit from this diversification, but in fact in part exist as intermediaries for 
this very reason, as their diversified portfolios reduce their overall capital needs. B-II 
acknowledges this diversification effect, but only in the IRB approaches, where it 
allows banks to use an average correlation varying by asset class, e.g., between 0.12 
and 0.24 for corporations.
34  The capital reductions from using (low) correlations are 
significant and are one of the main reasons why the IRB-approach requires less capital 
than the Standardised approach. 
Both B-I and B-II may place insufficient emphasis on the potential risk reduction 
effects of diversifying international investment portfolios to include both developed 
and developing countries.  Such inattention raises the cost of capital and lowers access 
                                                 
32 For additional literature reinforcing these points, see e.g. Persaud (2002); Griffith-Jones et al (2002a, 
2002b). 
33 The accord stipulates that B-II should not lead to an overall increase in capital requirements 
compared to B-I; higher requirements for lower rated firms thus will be compensated by reduced 
requirements for lower rated firms. 
34 It also allows lower correlations for assets more subject to probable default since an increase in the 
asset default risk is argued to indicate a more idiosyncratic nature of the asset, thus justifying a lower 
correlation.  Current correlations to be used for other asset classes are, for example, 0.15 for mortgages, 
0.03 and 0.16 for retail exposures, etc. with further adjustments for maturity. 
  24to external financing for developing countries (Griffith Jones et al. 2001).  Developing 
countries as a group exhibit a lower correlation with developed countries than the 
correlations among most assets within countries or from different developed 
countries.  The potential diversification benefits from lending to developing countries 
may be large, justifying lower capital adequacy requirements. Griffith Jones et al. 
(2001) show that the chance of unexpectedly large losses on a portfolio evenly 
distributed across developed and developing countries is some 25 percent lower than 
that of a portfolio only distributed among developed countries. Consequently, the 
capital adequacy charges should be set lower for a well-balanced portfolio that 
includes developing countries. An additional aspect is that by not accounting 
sufficiently for the risk reduction effects of portfolio diversification, B-II may lead to 
a higher concentration of lending in less risky, but more correlated segments of the 
economy or of the world, thus leading to higher systematic risk. 
This argument about the possible negative effects of B-II is, however, like the 
other ones, only relevant if capital adequacy requirements are binding and not if banks 
already can, and do, allocate capital according to economic criteria without regard to 
formal capital constraints.  Furthermore, there is presumably a supply of assets within 
developed countries which also have low correlations with other assets that also could 
provide the diversification benefits sought.
35  The issue of low(-er) correlations for 
some specific assets raises the question whether adjustments should be allowed within 
the approach for specific assets or whether a generic approach should be 
maintained.
36    
                                                 
35 A complete test would then also require comparing the diversification benefits from investing in 
emerging markets with those available from investing in all type of assets; this is done in the so called 
spanning literature. 
36 The fact that there is already guidance on asset specific correlations in the IRB suggests that the BC 
has answered this question positively. 
  25Procyclicality is another significant criticism of particular relevance for 
developing countries.  If B-II relies more than B-I on market signals, in the form of 
both asset prices as well as ratings, this means that B-II relies little on the ‘soft’ 
information used in traditional relationship banking, an additional bias against lending 
to (unrated) SMEs.  The market approach also implicitly assumes that the aggregation 
of good practices in individual institutions leads to stability at the systemic level.  
However, B-II sensitivity to market signals via VaRs and to some extent also via 
rating agencies (although the latter claim to rate borrowers across business cycles on 
relative, not absolute terms) may be enhancing the very procyclicality already 
inherent in market prices.  If a wide range of ‘systemically important’ banks responds 
simultaneously and in the same way to perceived risks⎯as reflected in prices and 
ratings in the market, downturns and upturns may be reinforced as banks downgrade 
or upgrade clients on a large scale.  This issue may be of particular concern for 
emerging markets whose asset prices and ratings are already more volatile than those 
of developed countries as it could make their external financing more volatile. 
A few last criticisms have been raised, with also specific implications for 
developing countries.  The hallmark of B-I was its simplicity, at the cost of some 
insensitivity in terms of credit risk.  The hallmark of B-II may be its complexity.  
Satisfying this complexity raises compliance costs relatively more for smaller and less 
sophisticated banks, erecting barriers to entry and hindering competition.  This affects 
again especially banks in developing countries that tend to be smaller and less 
sophisticated, putting them at a competitive disadvantage relative to large banks from 
developed countries.  Another, more subtle effect of B-II's complexity and stress on 
sophisticated use of market data, internal models and rules, is that they can generate a 
false sense of security irrespective of real market conditions.  Furthermore, they can 
  26facilitate regulatory capture as either supervisors ‘hide’ behind technical complexity 
or are overwhelmed by bank-based information.  Again, this can affect developing 
countries especially as financial institutions tend to be less well managed and 
supervisors have fewer resources to oversee banks and, often being less independent, 
are more subject to capture in the first place.  We next analyze the quantitative 
importance of some of these criticisms as they affect developing countries.   
 
3.  The impact of Basel II on developing countries   
 
If one may conclude from the analysis so far that B-II has largely been negotiated 
with the interests of developed country financial systems and institutions in mind, it 
remains to be determined more precisely what the impact on the interests of 
developing country economies and financial systems will be.  It is well established 
that the typically low-rated, developing country sovereign and the banks and firms in 
these countries suffer from limited access to financial services and from procyclical 
lending patterns. At the same time, the level and stability of financial flows to 
developing countries and the growth of firms within these countries are closely 
associated with these countries’ development prospects.  As argued in the previous 
section, B-II will affect capital flows to developing countries through the cost and 
volume of developed country bank lending and through the procyclicality of 
international lending.  The shift in costs will be especially significant for OECD 
emerging markets with B-I zero weightings (currently Czech Republic, Hungary, 
Mexico, Poland, Slovak Republic, South Korea and Turkey).  For developing 
countries implementing B-II domestically or which have a large presence of foreign 
banks that will apply B-II, the cost of capital for local firms and the procyclicality of 
lending within the country can be adversely affected.   
  27Both international and domestic effects need to be evaluated relative to the B-I 
regime, to the extent the current regime is already binding on international and local 
banks. The impact of B-II on bank capital adequacy requirements and associated 
lending conditions has been the subject of a number of investigations, including BC’s 
own quantitative surveys (the latest being Quantitative Impact Study (QIS) 5, Basle 
Committee 2006c).  These QIS results are discussed here only as they relate to 
developing country economies local lending conditions.  The main part of this section, 
however, is devoted to presenting new results on the effects of B-II on international 
capital flows, employing a set of actual bank internal ratings and comparing those 
with data from rating agencies.  This data significantly enhances the understanding of 
the impact of IRB-models relative to the Standardised approach.
37
 
Effects on local financial conditions 
 The BC analysis (Basle Committee 2006c) provides some, although limited 
indication concerning the effects of B-II on lending within developing country 
financial systems.  The QIS-5 study shows that the Standardised approach is the most 
likely approach to be adopted by the smaller banks in the non-G-10-countries, and 
these banks will also experience the highest rise in capital relative to B-I.  It also 
shows that even the Foundation IRB approach will have negative effects for smaller 
banks in developing countries, although not as serious as some have claimed.  In turn, 
these increased capital adequacy requirements will lead to higher cost of capital for 
borrowers.  Other analyses confirm these potentially adverse impacts of B-II for 
developing countries.  Majnoni, Miller and Powell (2004), for example, show using 
data from Argentina that the Foundation IRB (notwithstanding its benevolent risk 
                                                 
37 Remembering that most developed country lending to developing countries will be carried out by 
large banks employing the advanced IRB approach, not the Standardised approach where increases in 
capital costs are more obvious.  
  28calibration) leads to an average capital adequacy requirement of about 15%, higher 
than B-I.  In the case of Mexico and Brazil, the Foundation IRB approach would, 
according to their simulations, yield requirements of around 10% and 14% 
respectively ⎯ higher than B-I’s 8% and higher than current required levels in 
Mexico (8%) and in Brazil (11%).  This increase in capital adequacy requirements 
will in turn translate into higher lending rates for locally-based firms and households.  
Indeed, Shin and Chang (2005) demonstrates that the adoption of the BIS capital 
adequacy ratio in Korea following the 1997-98 economic crisis created a severe credit 
crunch and damaged the growth prospect for the Korean economy. 
 
The Cost of External Financing  
Several papers have shown that B-II will increase the costs of external financing for 
many developing countries (Griffith-Jones et al 2002b; Reisen 2001; Weder and 
Wedow 2002).  Weder and Wedow (2002) show on the basis of the proposal as of 
November 2001 that, by simply applying B-II versus B-I and using publicly available 
rating agency data, spreads charged by banks could change between 40 basis points 
for A-rated borrowers and 2000 basis points for CCC-rated borrowers under the 
Foundation IRB approach and between 40 basis points for A-rated borrowers and 350 
basis points for CCC-rated borrowers under the Standardised approach.  These effects 
are significant.  Their results also imply that countries rated less than BB- could see 
their cost of capital go up under the IRB-approach.  But, for the Standardized 
approach only borrowers rated worse than B- would see their spreads increase.   
As of 2001, 10 out of the 26 developing countries rated by S&P were less than 
BB-. At that time, only 3 out of 26 rated developing countries were rated less than B-.  
As of October 2006, 55 developing countries (countries with income per capita less 
  29than $10,000) have been rated.  Of these, 25 countries are rated less than BB- and 2 
countries are rated less than B-. This shows that some, but not the majority of rated 
developing countries would thus see an increase in spreads on the basis of a 
mechanical application of B-II.  Of course, all other developing countries are not 
rated; although many will not have access to capital in the first place, may see some 
impact as well.  In addition, QIS-5 claims that the Advanced IRB approach will lead 
to some significant reductions in capital requirements to less risky loans in developed 
countries.  As a consequence, incentives for portfolio reallocation away from the 
riskier economies will add themselves to the rise in the cost of capital there. 
This comparison of spreads already shows some of the possible differences 
between the approaches using more ratings.  These results, however, are still based on 
simulations assuming that internal ratings (IR) are the same as external ratings (ER).  
Whether the use of actual IR might alter this conclusion depends largely on whether 
that would yield a higher share of lower rated borrowers, how IR evolve relative to 
ER and on the actual usage of the different approaches under B-II (Standardised 
versus IRB). 
Access to the IR data of a major, internationally active Dutch bank to permits 
more detailed analysis.  The data covers a longer period of country ratings than ER 
agencies such as S&P or Moody’s, and also covers many countries which have not 
had (or sought) such ratings.  As such, the analysis provides also a better perspective 
on the use of ratings in general.
38
The first comparative step is to map IR from the bank with ER of S&P and 
Moody’s, converting all ratings to an ordinal scale from 1 to 20 (Table 1).  The Table 
also provides the default probabilities as calculated by S&P and Moody’s for 
                                                 
38 For a full description of the data, see Claessens and Embrechts (2003). 
  30equivalently rated corporate sector borrowers, so as to calculate needed capital 
adequacy requirements and resulting spreads.   
Table 1: Risk Mapping between Internal and External Ratings and default 
probabilities of S&P and Moody’s 
 
 
S&P ratings  Internal rating  Default Moody's  Default prob. S&P 
AAA 18  0  0 
AA+ 17  0  0 
AA 16  0  0 
AA- 15  0,06  0,03 
A+ 14  0  0,02 
A 13  0  0,05 
A- 12  0  0,05 
BBB+ 11  0,07  0,12 
BBB 10  0,06  0,22 
BBB- 9  0,39  0,35 
BB+ 8  0,64  0,44 
BB 7  0,54  0,94 
BB- 6  2,47  1,33 
B+ 5  3,48  2,91 
B 4  6,23  8,38 
B- 3  11,88  10,32 
CCC+ 2  18,85  21,32 
CCC 2  18,85  21,32 
CCC- 2  18,85  21,32 
CC 2  18,85  21,32 
Selective Default  1  18,85  21,32 
Note: The risk mapping assumptions are based on Table 3 from Claessens and Embrechts 
(2003).  The default probabilities are taken from Weder and Wedow (2002), Table II.2, with 
the modification that the C-category and SD are separately classified, although they have the 
same default probability. 
 
 
We next recalculate the results for the changes in spreads for the various credit classes 
using instead of the usual ER our IR.  Table 2 provides the results for default 
probabilities from S&P (results from Moody’s are very similar).  Since the ER and IR 
map closely, the IR results show similar effects as the ER.  The cost of international 
bank financing for the worse-rated countries could rise under B-II by up to 1700 to 
  311900 basis points compared to B-I.  The better-rated countries, however, could see 
their costs decline by up to some 150 to 180 basis points.
39   
 
Table 2: Adjustments in spreads for equivalent rates of return under B-I and B-
II  
















18 0 0,00 0,00 0,00NA  0,00
17 0 0,00 0,00 0,00NA  0,00
16 0 0,00 0,00 0,00NA  0,00
15 0 0,03 15,72 1,26 0,00 0,00
14 0,5 0,02 13,87 1,11 45,07 -43,07
13 0,5 0,05 19,17 1,53 32,60 -40,41
12 0,5 0,05 19,17 1,53 32,60 -40,41
11 1 0,12 28,82 2,31 43,37  -71,18
10 1 0,22 39,19 3,14 31,90  -60,81
9 1 0,35 49,62 3,97 25,19  -50,38
8 4 0,44 55,62 4,45 89,90  -177,54
7 4 0,94 79,34 6,35 63,02  -82,65
6 4 1,33 92,04 7,36 54,32  -31,84
5 7 2,91 126,89 10,15 68,96  188,23
4 7 8,38 215,47 17,24 40,61  808,26
3 7 10,32 242,79 19,42 36,04  999,51
2 7 21,32 362,43 28,99 24,14  1837,03
2 7 21,32 362,43 28,99 24,14  1837,03
2 7 21,32 362,43 28,99 24,14  1837,03
2 7 21,32 362,43 28,99 24,14  1837,03
1 7 21,32 362,43 28,99 24,14  1837,03
  
According to this calculation, and considering only those 40 countries for which 
we have both ER and IR as of end 2000, the number of countries that would have seen 
their cost of external financing increase on the basis of the IR as of end 2000 was 
actually less than half (Figure 1). The impact of Basel II could be therefore interpreted 
as on average neutral.  This observation is of course very dependent on the time 
period chosen since most middle-income developing countries had then a rating 
higher than a scale of 6.  If ratings were used as of early 1990s, when developing 
                                                 
39 There is again the assumption that the capital adequacy requirements are binding and that the 
required rates of return are determined in line with the observed spreads for each borrower.    
  32countries were generally rated lower (Figure 2), then there would be more countries 
with an increase in spreads than countries with a drop.  The IR (and the ER) may have 
improved over time as countries’ fundamentals improved, which is confirmed by the 
further progression since 2000 when developing countries growth has generally been 
favourable, creditworthiness has increased, and average ratings have increased.   
Figure 1 
  Number of countries which have a positive, neutral, or negative spread change due to Basel II  
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  34The average impact of B-II, based on these results, is thus modest. Regardless, 
there remain a number of countries already having difficulty obtaining financing for 
which B-II has adverse impacts on the cost of their external financing.  Importantly, 
the overall impact of B-II on developing countries may be more adverse than 
previously noted when using ERs only. Typically, the countries without an ER are the 
less creditworthy countries. Indeed, the data show that the IR are on average lower 
than the ER.  Figure 3 shows that the increases in the average required spread under 
B-II using the IRB approach compared to B-I for the complete sample of developing 
countries for which we have either IR or ER.
40 Under both ratings, the spread change 
is positive. Using the IR, however, the average increase is higher than for the ER, 
largely since the bank rates more countries, including lower creditworthy countries. 
The studies based exclusively on ER thus underestimated the effects on spreads as 
only the more creditworthy borrowers are rated by S&P and Moody’s. 
Figure 3 
 
Average spread change in basis points under Basel II to produce risk adjusted return under Basel I 
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djII I i l Avg. spread adj. S&P
                                                 
40 Note that IR includes almost all countries; only around 1997 does S&P cover as many countries as 
the IR. Since in the beginning of the period, S&P rated only the best, capital requirements based on ER 
are lower on average, so the graph before 1997 is biased. 
  35 
As several papers have pointed out, there are some weaknesses in this form of 
analysis since a number of factors might mitigate the impact of B-II.  These mitigating 
factors include the fact that the simple analysis presumes that banks want to keep their 
risk-adjusted rates of return the same under B-I compared to B-II.  The ex-ante 
required rates of return implied by the capital adequacy weights under B-I and using 
the corporate default probabilities are already quite high, however.  For low rated 
borrowers, for example, the capital adequacy requirements combined with the default 
probabilities of the corresponding rated class of corporations imply required a three-
fold increase in spreads (for B-rated assets). These very high required spreads for 
lower rated borrowers are the result of applying the same ex-ante required rates for 
each credit class under B-II as under B-I.  Using a more realistic assumption that 
banks use a fixed hurdle rate across all asset classes (of, say, 18 percent as suggested 
by Powell, 2001) would lower the increases in required spreads to between 100 and 
200 basis points for lower rated borrowers.  Of course, this hurdle rate is ad-hoc and 
potentially inconsistent with the principles of the risk-based approach, which requires 
different rates as adjustments are made for risks, but it still shows some of the 
sensitivities. 
Another mitigating factor is that developing countries do receive funds from 
sources other than banks that are not subject to capital adequacy requirements, such as 
capital markets and non-bank financial institutions.  This would reduce the impact of 
B-II. Of course, the access to capital markets and other financing may be more limited 
for precisely lower rated countries, thus negating this effect for these countries.  
Another mitigating factor is that banks using the Standardized approach face lower 
capital requirements than those using the IRB approach when lending to lower rated 
  36borrowers (specifically in the range below BB+).  Some clientele relationships may 
then arise whereby banks using the IRB-approach choose to lend to safer borrowers 
and the banks using the Standardised approach lend to riskier borrowers.
41  
These competition and clientele effects can thus mitigate some of the impact of B-
II.  Still, it cannot be assumed that these will be perfectly offset (in the presence of 
perfect substitutes, mandatory capital adequacy requirements would never be relevant 
as there always would be some alternative source of financing available elsewhere).  
Borrowers may, for example, prefer to borrow from IRB-banks than elsewhere, even 
when spreads increase.  For example, these banks may better be able to assess, 
monitor and manage risks, and for those reasons may be able to provide financing to 
countries relatively more cheaply than other banks or the general capital markets.   
The most important adjustment, however, to the simple calculations is that banks 
may not be constrained by the (new) capital adequacy requirements as they may 
already be adjusting their economic capital in line with the risks associated with 
particular countries.  Of course, this argument makes B-II in a general sense 
irrelevant: if banks are already doing what economic capital models require, then 
there would not be any impact of capital adequacy regulations, even when properly 
based on such economic models.  This goes against the general thrust of having an 
accord in the first place, so it is reasonable to assume there is some binding effect of 
B-II and some effects on banks’ costs of lending and  consequently on spreads.
42   
                                                 
41 While this may mitigate the effects on developing countries, it would go against the objectives of the 
new Basel accord in the first place as it introduces another distortion and may lead to risk-taking by 
those banks least qualified to assess risks. 
42 Weder and Wedow (2002) investigate the issue of binding in more detail by studying the 
relationships between actual loan volumes to emerging markets and the capital charges that would be 
required under B-II using the IRB.  They find that the capital flows from BIS reporting banks to 25 
emerging markets over the period 1993-2001 are already affected by the simulated B-II capital 
adequacy requirements, consistent with the interpretation that banks have already largely adjusted their 
claims using a model anticipating the new capital adequacy requirements.  They do find that German 
banks may have been constrained in lending, but not so the other countries. Nevertheless, there might 
still adjustment necessary for some countries, particularly if the new accord is not well calibrated; the 
  37In short, this section has demonstrated that on balance, the cost argument is not 
the most important to B-II from the point of view of most developing countries.  
While there can be impact for some borrowers, and especially for those with limited 
access to market-based external financing, it need not be large on average, especially 
as ratings improve as they have done in the last decade.  At the same time, the 
analysis has shown that there is little in B-II that specifically addresses the concerns 
of developing countries or anything that could be attributed to developing countries’ 
specific inputs. 
 
Volatility of external financing   
B-II may have another adverse effect through potentially reduced continuity in the 
access of borrowers to bank financing and increased volatility.  As noted, there is an 
element of procyclicality in B-II as it encourages greater use of models that rely more 
on market data, including asset prices, which are procyclical to begin with.  
Furthermore, requiring the same model type of many banks will induce convergence 
among them, thus increasing the risks of financial contagion as banks react 
simultaneously to the same or similar signals. These tendencies may be aggravated as 
the accord encourages greater use of ER and IR.  Both types of ratings are arguably 
somewhat volatile and probably procyclical (see Lowe, 2002).  Since developing 
country assets are already subject to more volatility and procyclicality than other asset 
classes are, the introduction of B-II might be particularly harmful for emerging 
markets. 
Here further study may determine whether IR and ER volatility and procyclicality 
might differ over time, important because B-II allows greater use of IR. On a cross-
                                                                                                                                            
simulation above suggest that some lower rated countries may see their costs increase sharply under the 
IRB-approach.   
  38country basis, the differences between the two types of ratings are generally small 
(Figure 4; see further Claessens and Embrechts 2002).  On an individual country-by-
country basis over time, however, the IR and ER are not perfectly correlated (Figure 
5).  For many countries, there is a low or even a negative correlation and the average 
of the correlations between the two ratings for a sample of 40 developing countries 
over the 1997-2001 period is only 0.42.
43   
                                                 
43 The sample is small and short as few countries were rated in the early 1990s. 
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basis. Some correlations are near zero due to the  ng series has (near) zero 
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Average total correlation: 0,42 
variance, which makes for very low correlations. 
 
  40This issue may also be analyzed by comparing IR to ER volatility.  If the IR are 
mo
We next look at the speed of adjus een IR and ER.  Arguments have 
lready been made that, while there is broad similarity, ER are less responsive than IR 
to events.  There has been evidence, for example, that ER are slower to adjust to large 
                                                
re volatile than ER, then there is some suggestive evidence that B-II may lead to 
more volatile lending.  When we compare the raw volatility, we find that the average 
(and median) volatility of the IR is higher than that of the ER (Figure 6).  The average 
variance of the IR is 0.99, while the average for ER is 0.48.  Using an F-test, we can 
show that the difference is statistically significant at the 1% level.  On a simple 
comparative basis, IR are thus much more variable than ER.
44  Assuming that the 
behaviour of this bank is representative of the behaviour of others, greater use of IR 

















Variance Internal  
ii Variance S&P ratings
Total ave variance Internal ratings = 0,99 
Total average variance S&P ratings = 0,48 
44 We should note that the distribution of both ratings is not normal, and as documented there is 








































































































































































































































































































































































  41events, such as the East Asian countries’ financial crisis, than IR are.  Indeed, some 
simple graphical inspection of the data (Figure 7) shows that ER tend to be slightly 
more stable and adjust downward more in gradation, whereas IR adjust quicker, show 
less ratchet and have more one-off effects in downgrades.   





















* Mapping is done using correlation estimates. Rating of 15th of month is considered rating of the month  
A more formal test is to look at migration from period to period in the ratings in 
the form of matrixes of transition probabilities (Table 3a and 3b), using the same 
mapping as in Table 1. The matrices show the fraction of ratings in this period 
(vertical axis) that moves to a different rating in the next period (horizontal axis).  The 
percentages add up to 100% across rows.  It is clear that IR show more and sharper 
migration than ER do.  In the ER matrix, there are very few changes more than one 
notch away from that of the previous period. In contrast, and especially in higher 
rating categories, there can be sharp adjustments of IR at some points in time, often 
more than 2 or sometimes even 4 notches down.  Some of these moves are related to 
financial crises or sudden unwillingness to pay, where the bank takes quick actions 
and downgrades. Note, however, that the IR also show more drastic upgrades than the 
  42ER. In general, the comparison shows the forwardness of banks to change their ratings 
and the reluctance of the rating agency to change their ratings.   
Table 4a: ER Migration Probabilities 
 
Rating  18  17  16  15  14  13  12  11  10  9  8  7  6  5  4  3  2  1 
to 
18  100                     
17   100                   
16     100                 
15    6 88  6                
14        98  2               
13          98  2              
12          1  98  1             
11            3  3     9 3 3         
10            1    7  2 9          
9             3 7    9 0        
8               1  7    9 1       
7                1  8    9 1      
6                  95    5     
5                  1  1      9 4 3    
4                   2  8  9    
3                     96    4  
2                      93    7
1                     1 2   8   8
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Not The c ls depict the fractions f co tri  in  ch  ting clas tha ee  ey  ting nfirme n   
next period, along the diagonal, with the off-diagonal cells the fractions of countries that see th rating up- 
(abo diagonal) o dow ad  (be w d on ).  T e period ove d is tho  for ich bo R d ER 
are available, with sample of 1369 observations and using 41 emerging countries. 
 




6. Conclusions     
This article has argued and offered evidence in support of the following points.  First, 
it argued that the debate over the reform of financial architecture has been 
ed relative to the frequency and depth of financial crises 
es:  el  o un es ea ra   s  t s th ra  co d i the
eir 
ve  r  ngr ed lo iag al h  c re se  wh th I  an
These simple comparisons do not imply that either IR or ER are worse predictors 
of the true creditworthiness of countries, since correction needs to be made for the 
latile enough’ if the external rating agencies do not adjust their ratings in line with 
the changes in the underlying volatility.  The higher volatility of IR may then more 
accurately reflect the higher volatility of the underlying fundamentals.  The prob
how to take into account the fundamental creditworthiness of borrowers.  Measures 
such as secondary market prices for debt (or spreads) suffer from the problem that 
spreads are endogenous to the ratings themselves (although there is some evidence 
that spreads are better predictions of country fundamentals than ratings are).  Lowe’s
(2002) review of studies suggests that capital adequacy requirements derived from 
S&P are less cyclical than those derived from IR, even when considering 





  44in emerging market countries.  The system has not been seriously adapted to the needs 
of developing and other emerging economies, and specific proposals to stabilize the 
system during debt workout processes following acute crises, such as the Fund’s 
Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism (SDRM), have been dismissed.  The onus 
continues to be placed on developing countries themselves to address internal 
weaknesses and strengthen their position in the global financial system.  Standards 
continue to be promulgated largely by developed countries and compliance monitored 
through the very institutions of global governance which they dominate.  Proposals to 
attenuate the market-based pressures of global financial integration and its 
consequences for the poor in the development process do not find their way onto the 
reform agenda despite evidence that these might bring benefits.
Secondly, this article analyzed directly at the political economy of the Basle 
process and how this policy process yielded the current proposal.  The evidence 
supported the claim that the Basle process was dominated by developed country 
supervisors in a close relationship with major developed country financial institutions, 
suggesting capture of the policy process underpinning international supervisory co-
operation.  This provides a clear explanation as to why the needs of developing 
countries might so poorly be taken into account by the BC, despite the fact that the 
new accord has major implications for supervisory practices and costs in markets 
around the globe.   
Finally, the article posed the question as to whether there is indeed evidence that 
the B-II will have an adverse effect on developing countries.  It reported evidence 
from the Basel Committee that B-II will imply higher capital adequacy requirements 
for institutions employing the Standardised approach.  These institutions tend to be 
                                                
45
 
45 See section 1 of Underhill and Zhang (2003), especially articles by Williamson (“Costs and Benefits 
of Financial Globalisation”) and by Cohen (“Capital Controls: the Neglected Option”). 
  45the
 more representative of the broader 
inte
 smaller banks located in non-G10 emerging market and developing countries.  In 
turn, this implies that their clients would see their cost of capital rise and access to 
financing decline.  It also found that B-II, although the effects on average are small, 
will have an adverse impact on the costs and volumes of capital flows to some lower-
rated developing countries.  Importantly, it found evidence that the procyclicality of 
capital flows to developing countries can increase with the use of internal ratings by 
international active banks.  The increase in fluctuations in the availability of external 
financing would be a very unfortunate outcome, given that developing countries 
already suffer from volatile capital flows.  
The clear implication is that if BC standards have such an obviously global impact 
as the BC itself claims and to which the evidence here attests, affecting the terms of 
competition among financial institutions and the cost of capital and incentives for 
portfolio formation worldwide, a committee
rests of the global community is required.  This argument applies equally to other 





  46Appendix: Calculations of required spreads and requirements 
 
The results for Table 2 used the following formulas, from Basel II modifications as of 
November 5, 2001 (so as to maintain comparability with the ratings which are also as 
of end 2001). http://www.bis.org/bcbs/qis/capotenmodif.pdf, page 5 
 
Correlation (R) =     0.10 × (1 - EXP(-50 × PD)) / (1 - EXP(-50)) +  
         0.20 × [1 - (1 - EXP(-50 × PD))/(1 - EXP(-50))] 
 
Maturity factor (M) =     1 + 0.047 × ((1 - PD) / PD^0.44) 
 
Capital requirement (K) =   LGD × M ×  
N[(1 - R)^-0.5 × G(PD) + (R / (1 - R))^0.5 × G(0.999)] 
 
Risk-weighted assets =   K * 12.50 
 
We assume, like Weder and Wedow (2002), LGD=50 (see their note 6, “In the 
consultative document from January 2001, the Basel Committee expressed its belief 
that a LGD rate of 50 per cent for senior unsecured claims”). 
 
This yields the formula used: 
 
Risk-weighted assets=  
625* N[(1 - R)^-0.5 × G(PD) + (R / (1 - R))^0.5 × G(0.999)] (1 + 0.047 × ((1 - PD) / 
PD^0.44)) 
 
For the table, we used the Libor spreads in Table III.1 of Weder and Wedow (2002), 
and the reported default probabilities of Moody’s and S&P in Table II.2 of Weder and 
Wedow (2002), respectively. The interpretation of the tables is similar to Table III.1 
of Weder and Wedow (2002). 
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